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Friday, 3Iarch 25, 1881. 
LIEGT.-GESER.~L C. P. BEAUCHAJIP WALKER, C.B., Picc-Chair- 
man of the Council, in the Chair. 
ON OUTPOSTS. 
By Lied-Colonel LOSSDALE A. HALE, h.p., R.E., Professor, Staff 
Collegc. 
GESERAL BE.~UCIIA\JIP X‘dLFER, ASD GESTLEUES : 
I am fully miarc tliat in undertaking to lccturc a t  this Institution 
on thc subject of “ Outposts ” 1 am incurring the risk of being includcd 
in that class of indiriduals of ~vliom it is said tliat t h y  “rush in  d c r c  
“ angels fear t o  tread ;” for  of all branches of military art  there is 
probably no one about whicli Officers differ more, n-hethcr l-ritli regard 
to its theory or its practical application, than this sanx “ Outposts.” 
And it is a characteristic of this divcrgcncc of opinion that not onlydo 
these Officers entcrtain thc most profound bclicf i n  tlie ralw of tlicir 
own viers, but they h a w  at the same time tlic niost snprcmc contempt 
for those lield by others. To come here, thcrcforc, this afternoon to 
place bcforc sou a system of ontposts crolvcd from my o\\-;n inner 
consciousness or the rcsult of literary research, would simply be to sct  
m p l f  up as n target, at which each “ practical soldier ” ~ h o  takes 
par t  in thc subseqncnt discussion will fccl bound to discharge his most 
destructive missilc; and the pleasure Iic will fcel in doing so will bc, 
I will not say cnhanccd, but cerhinly not diminishcd, by tlic fact that  
tlic target is a “ Professor ” and that the Professor is furnished from 
the most popular military educational establishment in  conncctiou 
mit?i tlie Service. I do not, tlicreforc, purpose to perform the act of 
“ happy despatch,” but I prefer to act  as a basc from which a discus- 
sion may start ;  and the best way in which I can carry out this objcct 
secms to bc to placc before you thc way in mliich the principles of out- 
post duty arc rcduccd to practice in thc principal armies of the 
Contincnl; and inasmuch as i n  the course of the last ten or  elcrcn 
scars I haw Iiacl. off and on, n considcrable amount of instructional work 
in ccniicctioii with ontposts, and knovi, tlicreforc, tlic difficulties rnct 
with in this duty, I hope i t  will not be deemed prcsurnptuous o n  my 
part if in tlic course of the lecture 1 submit for considcration sonic 
conclusions at u-hicli I hnvc mysclf arrived. 
The ontposts dealt with this afternoon will bc tho nornal outposts, 
those prcsxibcd in thc Regulations of tho rarious armies as the out- 
posts, tlic spirit of mliicli is to  be followed when thc letter cannot bc 
obcycd. Thcy arc, thcrcfcrc, thc outposts of a force, in position i t  may 
be, or on tho march, arriving ou the ground in time to select tho best 
linc for thc outposts, and to girc to thc outposts the most suitable 
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OX OUTPOSTS. 443 
arrangement,. They may remain on the ground for a day or t r o ,  and 
arc within one or t r o  days’ march of the enemy. They arc complete 
in numbcrs, that is to say, the body irhich they cover is numerically 
strong enough to supply all the hchclons of the force ; they are complete 
i n  a11 arms, mainly infantry, bnt mith cavalry, engineers, and artillery 
also. 
There will, thcrcforc, be cxcluded from consideration ‘ I  irregulnr ” 
outposts, by which term is implied not the outposts used in warfare 
against uncivilized nations, but modifications of normal outposts in 
regular warfare j as, for instance, the arnmposti irreplari  of the 
Italians, which are outposts of n force arri&g on the ground too late 
to selcct the most suitable line for the outposts, 01. to girc them any 
systematic arrangcmcnt, and consisting of piqnets thrown out on the 
lines of approach from the  front and on the practicable ground bctvieen. 
Neither d l  be dealt with the outposts of an inresting force, as 
tlicse are hardly normal, and morcorcr have been already fully 
rlescribed by General Beanchamp Walker1 and Colonel Schaw? in the 
lectures they gave some years ago at this Institution with reference to 
the German dispositions in front of Paris and Xctz respectively. 
A t  the outset let me say that the sources whence I hare derivrd the 
information contained in this lecture arc tlie official Regulations of the 
nrmics rcfcrred to. I have consulted tho originals in all cases, except 
those of Russia and of Holland. To Lieutenant J. J. Loverson, R.E., I 
am indebted for a w r y  full abstract of the Russian Regulations, and to 
Captain Hurray, 89th Regt., D.A.Q.M.G. in Dublin, for a similarly 
fnll abstract of the Dutch Rcgulations. 
The objects sought to be attained by the outposts of all armies arc 
1. To secure time for the main body to get undcr arms and ready to 
2. To obtain information respecting the enemy. 
3. To prevent the passage of unauthorized persons across the ont- 
post line. 
4. To prcvcnt the repose of the main body being disturbed. 
But before procceding to show Iiow thcsc objects arc attained, it is 
clcsirable to say LL fern words with regard to the nnmber of men em- 
ployed on outpost dnty. This number is a varying proportion of tlic 
ivholc force. The maximum is with the Italians, who allom one-third 
of the xhole  force to be employed in the case of an isolated division, 
but from one-fourth to one-eightlh reprcscnts the a-rcrage proportion in 
tlie various armies. 
As regards the numbcr thus employed, two remarks, inconsistent with 
cach other, are sometime; made. The first is that the numbcr employcd 
is too large, and eonseqncntly the force will be exhausted in the perform- 
ance of the dutF. It must be remembered, hon.crcr, that security no  
more than uictory can be obtained save a t  the sacrifice of human life ; 
Journal, v d .  IT, page 806 et seg. 
four in number :- 
reccirc the enemy. 
2 Vol. xviii, page 18 et sey. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [J
oh
ns
 H
op
kin
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
3:4
4 1
0 J
an
ua
ry
 20
15
 
444 0s OUTPOSTS. 
and it ~vould seem to bc a pcnnj--wisc and pound-foolish policy to 
refuse to sacrifiec a fcn- men a t  the outposts, if by so doing the result 
nil1 be beneficial to the main body. The othcr remark is to thc effect 
tliat tlic outpost forcc is too small t o  cffer cffectim rcsistancc. This 
rcmark seems to be founded on a misconception of tlic naturc of the 
attack outposts arc intcndcd to meet. It is not absolutcly impossible 
that a body of troops may find themselves attacked at night, as was 
Narmont’s corps at  LaGn, by an enemy advancing in fighting order 
across countiT, but such an attack is in the higlicst dcgrec improbable, 
and it is against probabilities, nol possibilities, that outposts haw to 
guard. Thc attack nhich outposts arc postcd to mcct is that of an 
enemy advancing dong thc roads and othcr lincs of approach, prcccded 
by adcanccd guards and adopting the ordinary measures of prccaation. 
An enemy advancing to the attack is ncrcr quite surc as to the exact 
position of his adrersarj- j he does not wish to fall into any trap, and 
hc mows forrmrd morc or less cautiously. It is this advance that 
outpo’ts arc intcndcd to opposc and still further to retard. 
We Kill now procccd to consider the methods adopted to attzin thc 
first object, “ to procurc timc for tlic main body to get under arms and 
“ ready to rcceivc the enemy,” wliich togctlier Kith the sccond, “to obtain 
“information rcspccting tlic cncmy,” and \rhich is, in fact, apar t  of it, is 
tlic primary object of all outposts, that compared to which all others sink 
into compxativc insignifieancc. So much importance do the Germans 
attach to this object of procuriug timc that it is in  thcir Regulations 
assigned as tlic principal end to bc kept in vicrr by commanders of 
outposts in all circumstances mhatcver ; and it is, morcovcr, oiic of thc 
two data, thc only tn-o on which tlicsc commanders hnrc to arrange 
their forcc, thc othcr bcing thc “ gcnernl situation of affairs,” a subject 
t o  wliich attention will bo speciaIIF directed in n subsequent part of 
thc lecture. 
To attain this objcct, tlicn, outpost forccs arc dividccl into two 
portions, one tlic smaller, the otlicr tlic Iargcr, to each of mhicli a dis- 
tinctirc task is assigned. 
Tlic first, thc smaller portion, is constantly on thc mom, collecting 
information abont Ihc cncmy; thc lnrgcr portion is stationary, and con- 
tributes its sliarc to tlic gencral rcsnlt by looking out for, resisting, o r  
both looking out for and resisting, tlic advancc of tlic enemy. It is 
with the work done by the smaller portion that I sliall dcal first, 
bccailsc not sufficient importancc has becn attached to it hitherto in 
our  own Scrvicc. 
In connection with this matter, it must bc rcmenibcrcd that outpost 
duty cannot bc thoronghly performed until both cavalry and idantry 
work togetlier a t  i t  in closc co-opciation. 
IU tlie German Regulations wc rend :-“ Thc connection of tIic tn-o 
“ arms, and co-operation bctmcen them, is n necessity for carriing 011 
“ outpost duty. Seldom, and only at  greater distances from thc 
“ cnemy, will cavalry alonc bc able to perform the task thoroughly, 
“ and yet morc seldom, and only nnder very peculiar Conditions of 
“ ground, mill infantry be ablc to clo this, uuless aided by ca ra l r~ .  
‘‘ In  a11 outpost cscrciscs, thercforc, mherc tlic naturc of the garrison 
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F A  E S G U  F R E X  C.H 
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G R A N D  C A R D E .  
FELOWACH - CUDS 
I T A L I A N  
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O S  OUTPOSTS. 445 
' I  rcndcrs it feasible, and i u  11-orking thcsc, must carc bc taken to aim a t  
" thorough co-opcration of both arms." Whilst the Italian " Instruc- 
" tions for Outpost Duty" treat equally of infantry and ca-ialry, 
'' because," so runs tho wording, ' l  Officcrs must know. cqually about 
" what concerns both arms, on account of thc frequent conncction 
" bctmecn them in the sewizio di sicwezra." 
In  the task of procuring information both cavalry and infantry take 
part, but over very different arcas of ground. Infantry patrols do not, 
crcn in the German outposts, go much morc than 2,900 ynrds bcrond 
the sentry line, and thc distance that can bc traversed by men on foot 
must nccessarily bc comparati\-cly small. Thc information obtained by 
infantry patrols must, although rcry important, be necessarily gleaned 
from thc immcdiatc vicinity of the scntry line. But there is not 
unanimity as to thc cstcnt to which pntrolIing should be carried. 
Dutch, Russians, Germans, and Austrians practisc patrolling estcn- 
sircly, d i l s t  thc Frcnch, as regards night work, say : ' I  At night timc 
I' patrols arc sent outsidc thc line of sentries only cxccptionally, and 
" then t h y  arc composed of wry few mcn." Whilst thc Italians, 
although giring definite instructions as rcgnrds patrolling, and recog- 
niziug tlic valuc of tho practice, say:-"Patrols must not be too 
I' numerous, because the duty is rcry fatiguing, and much and con- 
" tinual movcmcnt at  thc outposts kccps up a constant statc of dis- 
" turbancc, which is injurious, and a t  night may become dangerous." 
It is to the camlry that q-c must look to obtiin for us tho greatest 
amount of, and thc most important, information, a fact, Thich is 
perhaps not fully rccognizcd in  our Scrvicc, on-ing to  thc mrc occasions 
on which the tn-o arms act togcther. No limit is laid down in the 
Regulations as to the distance thc cavalry should patrol to the front. 
Cavalry can hardly go too far or too often; cavalry shouId bc con- 
spicuous by its abscncc from the main body of the outposts. A11 cxpc- 
ricncc shows how little Officcrs in command of a mixed forcc iindcr- 
stand the xorking of caralry, and liom feebly is realized the real 
mission of cadrF ,  namely, to rcducc to a minimum the inconveniences 
of timc and distance which beset commanders in the field, and a t  thc 
outposts as elscn-here. 
It is true that both thc Frcnch and the Gcrmans allorr thc employ- 
mcnt of caralry as stationary outposts in advance of the gcucral line 
of infantry outposts, bchind which thcy rctirc a t  night, the Germans 
allowing the caralry patrols to remain out in front on the roads a t  
night. Cases may occur in which cavalry may act with advantage as 
stationary outposts in a mixed force, and with considerable economy to 
the employment of the troops. 
A good instance of this usc of cavalry occurred on tho 13th and 14th 
August, 18i0,  wlicn thc 1st German Army Corps bivouacked on tho 
east bank of thc French Kicd, 10 miles from Uetz, its divisions bcing 
on the two roads to Netz, crossing the stream a t  Laudonvillers and 
Conrcclles Chaussy, 3 iuilcs apart. Each dirision thrcw forward on 
to thc western bank a strong advanced guard, which mas k i  helmed on 
thc roads. The outpost linc extended a t  right angles to thr: roads from 
St. Barbe on the north to Ogy on thc sonth, a distance of 4 miles, 
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A 4 4 6  ON OUTPOSTS. 
this line being 4 miles in advance of the main body of the corps, and 
being composed of two squadrons of divisional cava1r.y.’ 
But the circumstances Qf the case were in many points of an escep- 
tional character. 
The Italians make a good use of cavalry as yosti d’aziso parties of 
from three to sixteen men each, pushed forward some 1,600 to 2,000 
paces beyond the infantry sentry line, on to points whence CG good riew 
Can be obtained towards the enemr, particularly of the lines of 
approach, bridges, and main roads by which he can advance. 
Similarly the Swiss allow pickets of cavalry to be pushed to the 
front for purposes of obsermtion, but they are to obserre, and are not 
intended to fight. 
I t  is submitted that with regard to the cmploymcnt of the cavalry, 
with a mixed force a t  the outposts, the views held by Colonel Baron 
Waldstatten, of the Austrian Army, and giwn in his admirable work 
‘‘ Die Taktik,” are correct ; that  inasmuch as so long as the enemy is 
within 9 miles of thc infantry sentry line, an attack during the day is 
possible, it is to this distance, the minimum laid down for the cavalry 
pitrols in the Austrian Service, that the cavalry patrolling must 
cstend ; moreover, that at  each Huztptyost, and for orderly work-, some 
cavalry mill be required ; that three or four squadrons must bo forth- 
coming for the performance of all these duties, and that therefore, in CG 
mixed force of ordinary strength, there will not be any cavalry remain- 
ing availablc for stationary pickets. Patrolling and orderly work is 
the task therefore of the cavalry a t  thc outposts. 
We will now proceed to consider the ~ a p  in which the stationary 
portion of the outpost force perform their share of the task of seciiring 
time for the main body. 
1. Observation : Where outposts rely on seeing the advanco of the 
enemy in su5cient time to’give the necessary warning to the troops 
in rear. 
2. Resistance : Where this time is obtained by opposing, and thus 
delaying, the advance of the cnemy. 
3. Observation and resistance combined : Where both arc relied on 
Tlic first is employed by the Russians; the second by tlic Austrians, 
French, Swiss, and Dutch ; the third by the Italians. 
The Russian outposts consist of front line, approximately 2,800 
pices from the main body, of sentry groups (posti) ,  each of f i re to 
eight men, on the lines of approach, or at  the principal points in the 
chain, Kith intermediate posts of three to four  men. These groups 
arc from 100 to 300 pacca apart, being a t  night or in fog drawn closer 
together if necessary; they should be posted so as to see the whole 
intervening conntry, nnd so that no one can pass betvieen them un- 
observed or unheard. The posts on the roads act as examining groups. 
Of each group one man is on the lookout, and a second mau 
(poc7tcJiassocJ~) is with the rest of the group ten to fifty paces in rear, 
There are three means cmploycd :- 
cqually. 
Presumnblj 130 strong each. 
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OX OUTPOSTS. 4 i i  
on the xvatch for any signal giren by the look-out. I n  rear of thc 
posti, about 500 paces distant, are the supports (zasfuvi), each of eight 
to twelve men ; they are points for the collection of information which 
has come to the hornledge of the groups, they are near the prin- 
cipal roads leading from the enemy, and a t  cross roads, so as to 
bc easily found, and to be able to support the groups ; of these sup- 
ports, there are usually tFo or three to each company. The rescrw 
(g lnmi  Earnirl), if therc is one, is posted on the principal road leading 
through thc chain from thc enemy a t  a distance from the snpports, 
varying from 350 to 700 paces. The line selected for determining 
the position of the ontposts is that  mhich the sentry groups arc 
to occupy. Thc troops on this line are, first posted, then the 
snpports, and it  may happen that the wholc of the force is cspcnded 
in  tho formation -of these t r o  lines, especially in piooded or 
broken country, where a large number of supports arc requircd. 
In  this casc therc is no reserve, bnt as a rule, and sarc in  special 
circumstanccs, half the company would form snpports and chain, 
and the other half the rescrre. TVhcn the chain is so far from 
thc main body as likely to run the risk of being cut off, or too near to 
it to afford time for warning the main body, il general reserve is 
inserted between the compnny reserve and the main body. 
The Skkre'ti is a notcmorthy part of the system. Se'lire'ti is thc name 
applied to groups, each of two or three rcsolntc men who, taking with 
them their arms and ammunition, place themsclrcs a t  nightfall 
sccrctly in front of the chain to protect it from the unexpected attack 
of small parties or individuals. Se'iire'ti arc used especially in Asiatic 
wars, and in the investment of fortresses, wheu the enemy, takiug ad- 
vitntagc of close country, or of his own defensive piorks, can attack 
unexpectedly. Positions for them arc 
selected during the day, carc being taken, however, that the enemy 
does not watch the selection. Se'lm'li arc not relieved during tlio 
night; they do not challenge, ncither are they Fisited by patrols. 
If the enemy rushes unexpectedly on a Se'ii,bti, the latter must fire a 
shot, even if it be into the air, to gire the chain warning of the 
threatening danger. At daybreak the Si'I;.& retires without Kaiting 
t o  be relie-red. 
The com- 
mander of the outposts determines the position to be taken up by the 
ITnuptposten and the extent of gronnd to be guarded by each. A 
Huzcpfpost may consist of half a company, or  of sercral companics, 
according to thc importancc of the posts, and the resistance to 1)c 
offcred. The Ilaiytposfeit are stationed in the neighbourhood of tlic 
most important lines of approach, and where possible, a t  such points 
as command the communications, and permit a strong local defence. 
'Yhe retreat is to take place only after all means of defcncc are es- 
hausted. At a distance of, as a general standard, from 2,000 to 5,000 
paces behind the most distant Hnzrptpost is: the reserve, composed of 
half the whole outpost force ; it is kept together or broken up into 
portions, according to the natnrc of the conntry, being posted always 
in  resnect to the lines of approach. It is usually composed of all 
They are posted only a t  night. 
The Austrian system is essentially one of resistance. 
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4-18 OX OUTPOSTS. 
arms, and its mission is to  accentuate the resistance offered to tlie 
enemy. Some 1,200 paces to the front, and 400 to  800 paces apart, 
arc stationccl look-out posts (FeZc7zcnc7ie~i), composed of one ITitcler- 
oficier or Gefreife, and six to nine men ; a t  important points, or on the 
main lines of approach, thcy arc under the command of n subaltern. 
Although it is, as before mentioned, permissible for n IIuitptposf to  
retrcat after having exhausted all means of defence, the occasional 
necessity for self-sacrifice is not overlooked, as the following pam- 
graph shows. 
'' All Officers and soldiers employed on the service of security must, 
" impresscd Kith the great importance of the duty, bc ready to 
" sacrifice themselves for the safety of the main body." 
The French sjstcm is similar in spirit to the Austrian sj-stem, 
tkough slightly different in form. The line of the grand' gardes is the 
governing line; these gardes, usually each n company strong, are 
placed in the vicinity of lines of npproacli; in case of attack, they 
offer n stubborn resistance, falling back on the reserre, i-rhicli, com- 
posed of one-half the whole force, is usually placed some SO0 to 1,060 
paces in rcar, near the principal road by d i c h  the enemy may advance. 
Each g r a d '  i~nrtle pnshcs f o r r a r d  530 to  660 paces to the front 
a party equal to half its strength, -irhich is formed into pcfti fsposfes,  
which, reserving one quarter of the poqte for patrolling duty, throw 
forward 260 to  400 paces to  the front double scntries the same 
dtstances apart. 
In brokcn or wooded country posts of four men and  n corporal 
replace the linc of pet i fs  posfes and doublc sentries. 
I n  the Swiss Regulations we read :- 
" The service of protection a t  the outposts consists in closing tlic 
" roads leading from the enemy torrards the main body, by occupTing 
'' and defending the positions which command these rands. 
'' For purposes of defence, the ground to be corcred by thc outposts 
" is divided into as many scctions as there are roads leading from the 
" enemy. Several of thcsc scctions are formed into one principal 
" section. To cach priucipnl scction is assigned n corys de sitrcte, 
" mhicli allots tlic subsections among its subdi-cisions." 
Tlic first duty of the commander of the outposts is to sdcct n 
position for defence, and if scveral such exist he clesignatcs which of 
them is to be the principal onc. 
The force being divided into 91'09, soxtiei?s, and g m d '  gnrtTes, lic 
regulates tlic strength of these respectircly, according to the situation 
of the position of defence in the zone his force occupies. If it be 
near the rcar the yros is made strong, but if to the front tlie strength 
of the front &Idon  is increased. When the line of olsscri-ntion 
represented by the.  grnnd' gardes, with their double sentries, termed 
petiis posfes, is coincident with the position for (lcfenee, the  soi&zs 
arc moved up close to this linc. A grand' guri?c may consist of n 
whole company, or perhaps only a quarter of n conipany. The 
grm2tl' gardes are not further apnrt th?n GGO pnccs, the petits yos fes  
being 330 paces to the front and that distance apart. The so?~fiens 
are not more than 660 paces in rear of tlic grand' gnrdes. An 
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OX OUTPOSTS. 449 
inlying piquet is sonietimcs formed in addition to the gros as a second 
reserve. 
The gorerning 
!inc is the line of resistance, idiich mny be in line with the supports 
(zorpostcit dcfac7wze~ztea), 01% with the reserve (ztet gros dcr rorpoafeit), 
rarely in line with the piquets (veZclzcnc7~ten). The reserve, Iialf tho 
mhole force, is first posted, then the supports, each a t  least sixty to 
eighty men, 2,000 paces in  front, are each giren n ScCtiOn of ground to 
occupy, and the piquets, each abont forty men, are then posted 1,000 
paces forrrard; double sentries being placed 300 pnccs in admricc. 
Thc line of resistance is usually in front of the rcscrre, or where tlic 
supports arc : the piquets arc not intended to resist. The supports 
are placed on tlic main roads Ieading from the enemy. It is a 
pcculiaiity of the Dutch system that the line of supports may be tlint 
on rl i ich it is intended to offer battle. 
The Italians rely on ohserration and resistance equally to securc 
time. The front line, which is t h t  of observation, consists of groups 
(piccoli posfi) each of three to four men, nndcr a cornmandcr, and 
posted at such a d i s tn rp  from tlie main body that they s i l l  be nblc to 
xire notice of the approach of the enemy in sufficient time to enable all 
troops in rear, including tlic main body, to  get nndcr arms and be in  
readiness. Behind the piecoli postti are thc trro lines intended to 
secure time by resistance, and consisting of n line of gran gzrnrdic and 
a 1.isercn tl’avuniposti, and posted suficicntly fa r  in admncc of the 
main body to secure the time by the resistance offered. 
The commander T o d d  find little Uifficulty in  posting the troops to 
secure the time in tlicse two different wajs, were he not, ho~~-ercr ,  
hampered by n third condition, namely, that  the riservn is to be near 
enough to the gran gztardio to come to thcir assistance, oud the latter 
arc to be iiear enough to the piccoli p s t i  to afford them support. It 
must bc difficult somctimes to comply F i th  all these reqnircmcnts, 
which must occasionally be of a conflicting character. Thc normal 
maximum distances apnrt of the Echelons arc from piccoli p t i  to 
g r m  gztnrdie, GGO paces j grmi g?rnrt7ie to Tiserca, 2,600 paces, the riscrra 
being the same distance from the main body. The troops of all the 
6clielons are posted with regard to the approaches. 
The system of outposts in tlie German Army I hare rcscrrcd to the 
last, not only because i t  cannot be elnssified with any of thc systems 
described, but bccansc I am anxious to direct your attention specially 
to it. 
The German systcm is a very simple one ; but its execution could 
with safety be left only in tho hands of men in, so to speak, high 
military condition. Their Rrgnlations point ont the close intcr- 
depcndcncc be twxn security and information respecting the enemy ; 
possession of information being in some cases security itsclf; and 
they further admit forms only bccansc some forms are an absolute 
necessity for training troops and securing uniformity in virorking 
together. The forms they adopt are a, front line of Feldzraclm of 
thirty to forty men each, detaching double scntrics sonic 400 paces to 
the front, but only so many of these as shall allow one-third of each 
The Dutcli sSstem is essentially one of resistance. 
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450 OX OUlPOSTS. 
Feldzcac?~ to be available for patrolling. In tlie rear is the Gros, a 
rcserre forming the nuclcus for rcsistance and a reserroir wlicncc 
can be dmvn reinforcements for the troops in front. 
It is the position of Gros and Il'e7clzcaclien, and the posts to be 
occupied by the sentries day and night, that the commander of tile 
outposts determincs; but when nm look for distances or numbers by 
which he is to bo guided, we find of the former only the 400 pnccs 
and the thirty to forty men just  mentioncd, and of tlie latter only the 
instructions I quoted in  an  cnrlier part of the lecture, the " general 
c '  stafe qf afairs  aiicl the timo the in& body requires fo get ready for 
'' actio)i." He has tlic option, should lie tliink fit to exercise it, of 
posting on intcrmcdiate points betwcen the Gros and the ~clclzcnche~i,  
or on important points in the rayon of the outposts, or perhapsat 
night only, other posts termed Fipuets. 
The forcgoinfr short statcrnent contaius cvcrytliing of a definite 
charactcr to be found in the German Regulations. Thcre are dozcns 
of writers from n-hosc works I might hare drawn specific information 
as to German practicc, but in doing so I should hare conveyed to you 
a r e g  erroneous and an utterly false idca of tlie German systcm, 
which, as Geiieral Kaulbars slo\rs so clearly in his readable and 
interesting book, is to lcarc entirely to subordinate commanders the 
mode in wliicli . .  the general principles laid doivn by the anthoritics is 
to be carricd out. 
Lct me read to you some remarks on this subject which I have liad 
the good fortune to reccivc from a w r y  distinguished Officer in the 
German Army. 
'' As rcgards Outposts it lias always becn my idea that this important 
(' duty must be, as far as possible, freed from all trammcls of detail 
'( regulations. Gencml principles, of course, there must be, but the 
" detail of carrying them out must be more or lcss left to the com- 
'( mander in question. 
" The troops, as i ~ e l l  those arailablc or  necessary for the Outposts 
" as those that arc to be corcrcd by tlicm, the country in which tlie 
" outposts arc placed, the time of clay, the wxitlicr, the circumstances 
" undcr whicli, and the cncmy against idiom, they are to be placed, 
" are so multifarious and 'ercr-varying that it is absolutely impossible 
" to give instructions that would suit all cases. If you attcmpt to do 
" so you irould hampcr tlie intelligent and cnergctic Officer, and 
" irould girc many an indolent one a velcome excuse for any stupidity 
" he may be guilty of, or any negligcncc on his part, for which, 
" perhaps, no instructions, horevcr minute, could under all circum- 
" stanccs proride. 
" P u t  the same man in command of outposts in the same country 
'' and under different circumstances, and he d l  most certainly do it 
'' differently each time ; and place two different leaders in tho same 
I' countrg- and undcr exactly tlie same circumstanccs, and ewn thcn in 
" all likeliliood each will follow a different line according to his own 
" individuality, and each one may be right and successful. The great 
" thing is that the man entrusted with this important charge should 
" first duly considcr xyhat objcct is to be attained by his outposts, and 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [J
oh
ns
 H
op
kin
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
3:4
4 1
0 J
an
ua
ry
 20
15
 
OX OUTPOSTS. 451 
c c  then how hc is to do so. I hzre newr forgotten the saying of the 
" General under whom I made my first manmarre, and which I then 
II heard regarding outpost duty, which -3s- 
" ' Do what you will, but gire me a sensible reason for what you do j 
" 'nerer act Tithout one.' 
" Since then I hare had innumerable opportunities of referring to  
( 6  the dictum, and it is my aim to lead a11 under me to act up to it. 
u The General in qucstioii RCT-CI- blamed any measure in outpost duty 
6 '  without first asking tlic man, ' Wlmt was your idea in doing so ? ' and 
6'  rcry often refrained from blaming measures perfectly a t  rariancc 
" with his own ideas if the man only proved that be had first  ell 
4' reflectecl on That lie afterirards did. 
' 6  Xen learn more and gcncmlly work better when left as much as 
6' possible to thcir o-i-in intelligence, instead of being tied and bound by 
'' unnecessary leading strings." 
Sucl? is thc spirit of German military training. 
Thc normal arrangements such as I hare briefly skctcliecl arc for  the 
daytime ; as a rule, the codcs allo~v slight modifications of position for 
night Gutposts. The Dutch object t o  alterations, and point out t l in t  
tllc posts will probably hare been strengthened for dcfencc during the 
day. The Austrians do not alloii- sentries to be drawn in at  night, 
but introduce intermcdiatc posts (zzu~schen posten) into the original 
line of Feldicachen. The Italians arc 1-er-j- decided on this subject ; 
they reprehend strongly thc practice of drawing in the outposts a t  
night. "The arrangement of tlic outposts ought to be the same for thc 
' 6  night as for the clay ; the plan of bringing in a t  night the outposts 
nearcr to the main body is ordiuarily an inconrenicnt plan, becansc 
" the need for security is at  least as pressing b~ night as by day ; nor 
" is it dcsirablc to introduce fresh posts for night duty, bccause such 
'6 an ar impmcnt  is uneconomical, and leads to conhsion.'' 
It is n saying attributed to the Iatc Najor Adams, tliat the army 
which first learned to march a t  night would win the nest ensuing 
campaign, and that saying is probably correct ; moreowr against thc 
breech-loaders tlic night attacks offer many adrantages oser day 
a t t x k s ;  positions suitable for defence by day arc as a rule cqually 
defensible by night ; time and labour are hardly ever forthcoming in 
sufficient quantities a t  the outposts to allom of two sets of piquet 
posts being prepared for  defence, and it secms tlierefore little short of 
suicidal, voluntarily to forsake and to gire to an enterprising enemy 
the chance of obtaining possession of points wliich Todd have to 
regained next day at  perhaps a great espenditurc of lives. 
With regard to the third object-the second haring alrcad? 
been disposed of-which is to prevent the passage of unautliorized 
persons across the line, tho Regulations 1:iy down that sentries arc 
to be posted a t  such a distance apart as to prevent such persons 
crozsing. There is considerable dirergenco of riew as to d l a t  is 
the smallest distance sufficient to stop people passing. The Italians 
put their sentries GGO paces apart, and the Russians on tlic other 
hand admit of a reduction to 100 paces and men less; butas a matter 
VOL. XSY. 2 1  
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452 OX OUTPOSTS. 
of fact, this trying to carry out the second object must depend entirely 
on the way the first object is carried out. If everything gives may to 
the formation of the line of observation, and if, as is the case with the 
Russians, it is amatter of comparative indifference horn many troops arc 
left in the Cchclons in the rear, then undoubtedIy there can be formed 
n sentry line, which theoretically will stop anybody attempting to pass 
tllrough ; but if, as in the case of t he  Austrian?, the main point is tho 
rcsistznce afforded, then, on thc number of troops required to obtain 
that amount of resistance will be dependent the number of sentries 
that can be put for\mrd; and when apin,  as iii the case of the Gncnd‘ 
Gnrde of the French, and the Feldzcach of the Germans, from the body 
that furnishes the sentries a deduction is made of a considerable portion 
to act as patrols, it must be evident that then only in theory can bo 
formed a cordon of sentries which will completely prevent all access 
to the ground bcbind. It ~ ~ o u l d  be f a r  better in tlic face of actual 
cspcriencc to accept the permeability of the line of sentries. Any- 
body who has rcad the occurrences which took place round JIetz and 
Strasburg must admit this. It would be far better, in the face of that 
experience, to accept the fact that no line of sentries, however close, is 
impermeable, and to make up  for that by adopting the principle that n 
proportion of the adnncc line must be rcserrcd fo r  infantry patrols, 
and by paying far more nttcntion to tlic practice of infnntry patrols 
than has hitherto been given to it by our Service. 
I t  is as well to bear in  mind that ercn in posting a sentry linc 
thcrc maF be different vicm with rcgard to tho duties the sentrics 
hxvc to perform. Somctimcs the sentries arc intended to aid in 
resisting tho attack, a t  others they are intended to afford That 
is called mutual support; sometimes they arc intended merely to 
wive warning of the approach of bodies or individuals, and some- 
Zmes to compel individuals or bodies to halt. It must be evident, 
that an Officer in placing R piquet xrould place his sentries in a very 
different manner, according as one of those .four principles mas the 
guiding principle to be folloi\*ed, and the forgetfulness of the objects 
of sentries is sometimes the cause of divergence which occasionally 
csists between the commanding Officer of a battalion and his Officers 
in  command of piekcts. WC have all of us perhaps received the 
reproof, “ Why hwe IOU so many sentries; onc man can see n mile 
L‘  on each side of him?” Of course OUP reply would be “Yes, but 
“ I x-iould run the gauntlet between my own scutries 200 p r d s  apart.” 
The commander and his subordinate are Tiewing the same questions 
from entirely different stand-points. 
The fourth object, that of obtaining repose for the main body, is 
closely connected with the importanf question of horn far a sentry 
line should be from the main body. It is sometimes supposed, and it 
is laid down in our Regulations, that the outpost line should be so far 
from the main body that the main body sliall be secnrc from the shell- 
fire of the enemy’s artillery. Of the sisdifferent codes I hnvc studied, 
tlic French arc thc onlj-nation who allow this to enter into their calcula- 
tions at all ; and they consider, if the outpost line is distant 4,000 paces 
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OS OUTPOSTS. 453 
from the main body, the main body will be secure from artillery fire. 
Bu t  that  factor does not seem to entcr into the calculations of any 
other Army. I should imagine the cases in  history where B main 
body has really been disturbed by artillery fire arc so few, that it is 
hardly worth while to take the question of artillery fire into considcr- 
ation; and I mould submit that there is no distance which is appli- 
cable to bodies of varying strength, as tlie distance that their outpost 
line should be from them. There is no one distance xvhieh is e w n  
applicable to tlie same body in different formations, and I should sub- 
mit for your acccptancc the conclusions arrived a t  b1 Colonel Max 
Thyr, an Officer in the Austrian Service. I n  his excellent work " Die 
" Talitik," lately published, Colonel Xax T h p  declines to assign any 
specific distance, for he points out that tho distance from the main 
body depends on a variety of circumstances, among which he includes 
thc following : The size of the protected body of troops, the nature of 
their shelter, whether they are eucamped in cantonments or bivouacked j 
the character of the ground occupied by the outposts, whether 
farourable or not for defence ; the duration of the halt, whether for 
one or more nights j the iitornle and character of the troops vhicli the 
outposts are protecting ; and last, but not least, the character of the 
enemy, whether enterprising o r  not. If, then, n-c omit from 'our 
consideration this factor of the extreme range of artillcry for the pur- 
pose of annoTing the main body, the solution of the question can only 
be in  German fashion, namely, that it must depend upon " the general 
" situation of affairs, and the time required for the main body to get 
" under arms." 
Similarly with regard to the lateral extent of the outposts, how 
far they should extend to eithcr flank of the main body, no Regu- 
lations prescribe this in  any way; where danger is imminent equally 
all round, they say then the outpost force mnst be equally strong all 
round. It is not the proi-iuce of the outpost commander, it is for the 
I i ighst  authorities to determine that question. It would be impossible 
in  marfare to guard against crcrjthing that is possible ; what we can 
guard against is, that which is probable onlF, and it is only the higher 
leaders of a force who possess information wliich enables them to say 
d ie re  the probable ends and the possible begins. It may seem that 
this is somewhat shirking the giving of definite replies to these two 
questions in  lea&g so much to the circumstances of the case; but 
the Germans themselves lay such-great stress upon the circumstances 
of the case as attcnding the arrangement of an outpost force, that 
they say, '' In all outpost cscrcises in peace time, sarc thoso purely of 
" a drill character, a General Idea, " (which includes the general 
situation) " is to be given as the general basis of the exercise." 
I hare touched now upon nearly all the points which it is nccessnry 
to bring forward with regard to the principles of " outpost duty," and I 
~ o u l d  say D few 1)-or& with r e e d  to our ovn Regulations. It is not 
my intention in any way to criticize the Field Exercises, but i t  would 
be impossible for any man of ordinary intelligence to study We codes 
of half-a-dozen othcl: armies without feeling that our Outpost Exercise 
is not altogcther satisfactory ; that there are certain ambiguities 
2 1 2  
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454 ON OUTPOSTS. 
perhaps which might be made clear, and perhaps some hiatus nhicli 
requires to be filled up. It is, moreover, a qucstion whether a revision 
might not be advantageous to the Service, and if  such a revision 
were undertaken, it is to be hoped that two points i d 1  he borne in 
mind. The first is the necessity for giving more prominence to the 
duty of obtaining information, which duty has a subordinate position 
in  our own Field Exercises. The best step to doing that would he to 
remove from the place mliicli they wrongfully, I submit, occupy in the 
Infantry Field Exercise, the “ Outpost Regulations.” Outpost rcgula- 
tions and the way of carrying on outpost dnty is a matter for the Army 
as a whole, and not for one particular arm of the Service. I xonld 
saggest that a small outpost duty book be written ancl issued sepa- 
rately as a section of the h m y  Field Exercises, in wliic!i not only 
instructions for  what me call “ outposts ” should bc giren, but also 
instructions for that duty which is so intimately eonncetcd with it- 
the duty of obtaining infonkation, according to German nomcnela- 
ture, “ Aufkliirung-dienst ” and “ Sicherheit-dienst.” The German 
TTcrordnungen iiber die Busbildung der Truppcn fur den llclddicnst ” 
is an emmpIc of the kind of work suggested. 
With regard to the method in which the stationary outposts 
should carry out their part of the duty of securing time, it is to be 
hoped that the principle rhieh already exists in our Regulations may 
be still further cstendcd, and that the principle upon which the 
stationary portion is to be arranged may be of offering resistance on 
points on the lines of approach. I know that this can only bc done a t  
the expense of the sentry line, and I know in advocating the formation 
of a line of resistance as the principal point to be attended to, and a t  
the expense of the line of observation, I shall not carry i&h me 
those Oficcrs who lay great stress on obtaining a good line of observa- 
tion for their outposts. 
I would ask yon to listen to the character of the two allies wliicli 
offer thernselres to sou ; they arc rather two servants who want to 
enlist in your scrvicc ; they both promise to you the greatest assistance 
in their power, and the plausible one is the “line of obscrration.” If 
you assign to these hro servants an equal amount of authority in your 
houschold, your household will soon be thrown into uttcr confusion. 
One must be superior to the other. Remember what are the charac- 
teristics of this one who calls himself “ obserration.” Remember that 
treachery is a part of his character; it is innate in him. If you doubt 
it, take him out and m i t  until a snow-storm comes on, anti then sec 
what reliance can Ue placed on him; put him out a t  night, and scc 
what d u e  a “line of observation” is then: you will be shot or 
bayoneted before you ham time to tnrn round in your blankets. In tlii: 
meantime there is a “ line of resistance ” at hand, a scrvant who ncrcr 
fails yon in any case whatever, d u a b l e  in summer or in minter, in fog 
or in sanshine, a t  midnight or  in midday. The reason xliy the line of 
observation is thought so much of in our Service is, I renture to think, 
because most of us hare seen it only nndcr circumstances signally faronr- 
able to it, because ~e hare fern Generals so hard-hearted as to turn us 
out in a snow-storm to place our sentries, and to see what they --ill do 
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OX OUTPOSTS. 455 
then; and we hnvc no Generals so hard-liearted as to keep us out  all 
night on outpost duty, and see what tho valuo of the line of obscrra- 
rion is in tho dark hour which precedes the down. 00 the other hand, 
tho linc of resistancc has not 3 full sliarc of merit assigned to it, 
because few of us have been able to see it actually tried. The only 
way in wliich we arc abIc to test it is by those erratic decisions which 
I ,  probably in common with otliers, liave given a t  field manmuvrcs o r  
“ ICriegs-spicl,” bu t  nobody can fully appreciatc the real strength of 
rcsistancc by a forcc well intrcnchcd and armed with breech-loaders, 
iintil he has had painful and practical cspcrieiice of it. Therefore, 
while I would counsel the usc and employment of both thesc servants 
i n  your service, I \x-ould ask J-OII to  make the “ line of resistance ” 
supreme ; get mliat you can out  of the “ line of ob~ervation,” but trcnt 
liini as n friend who at any moment may turn  into a foe. 
So much with r e p r d  to regular outposts; and I inay be a11oinxl to 
csprcss iny regret that neither the Secretary nor inpelf liave becil 
nblc to obtain the aid of any Oniccr who has had any esperience in 
irregular warfare to tell us how far our outpost system is inapplicable, 
or d i n t  modifications arc required in it in warfare afrninst tribes like 
tho Zulus or tho Afghans. This is tlic more to  be regretted, as thcrc 
is an  idcn present in the minds of somc OtTccrs that. the traiuing and 
study of regnlar wrfarc  is of Iittle or no good in tlic warfare in whicli 
English troops are ordinarily engaged. This i w s  foi-cibly brought to 
my notice by a remark made to  mc shortly after I landed a t  Port, 
Durnford, unfortuiiately too latc to obtain any practical experience in 
this matter. A young subaltern addressed me as follom : “Well, 
“ Colonel, how about  our outposts?” (He did no t  mean niy out- 
posts, hc nieant the outposts of the “ Field Escrcises.”) “ How about 
“your  outposts that you used to teach n s ?  Nighty littlc good 
“ liarc t h y  been to us here.” Tlie subaltern was iny host at the time, 
and Iiacl been living for six months, off and ‘on, on trek os, and his 
livcr w\-ns certainly in no state for argument, still less for contradic- 
tion, so the nbaslicd Professor shrank into his shoes. I rodo down tlic 
coast aftcrimrds with my  warrior friend by my side, and lie pointed 
out  where the laagers and camps had becn, and i f  lie was here, I 
would hare  had him on his legs to tell us what I could not then fiud 
out, ~vliy tlic principles of our outpost regulations were inapplicahlc 
even iu Zulu warfare. 
I n  conclusion, I would, Sir, makc an appeal to you of a personal 
character. The grade of Officers who 11a-c-c the closest personal interest 
in outposts, considered in their widest aspect, and on whom thn 
subject has the most direct bearing, is the grade to  wliich I myself 
belong, namely, the Field Officcrs of thc Army, for on serricc thc 
commanders of the outposts mould usually bc selected from among 
them. Taking up a line of outposts hurriedly in a strange country 
is, lio\~-cvcr, a branch of our work in which few of us h a w  had any 
practical instruction, and I would, thcrcforc, appeal to you, Sir, as 
on this occasion the representative of the Gcncral Officers, to give us 
increased facilities for perfecting ourselves in this important ciuty. It 
could be done very simply indeed. All that  is required is, that  the 
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4 3  0s OUTPOSTS. 
General Officer commanding a t  n station should send d o ~ n  some 
morning, without aiiy previous warning, to any Ficld Officer he m a r  
selcct, a “general idea,” and that that Officer should be rcquired to 
turn out a t  once, and within three or four hours send to the General 
his report of the arrangement of his troops across a particular piece of 
country. Nobody is disturbed in  other work or taken from other duties 
save the OfEccr who has to make the report. 
B u t  when the report comes in, something else has to be done: it 
must be criticized, and the remarks, favourable or otherJrise, upon it 
must bc communicated ‘to the Officer 15-110 has made the report. The 
work had bcttcr not be done i f  it is to be docketed x i th  that zcal- 
suppressin” remark, “Rcad and noted.” If the work is worthy of 
commendation, commendation should be communicated to the Oflieer ; 
if it is badly done, the Officcr must be blamcd. It is possible that the 
majority of my brother Field O5eers may bc such thoroughly practical 
soldicrs that their work -r.i-oulil deserve nothing but the highest com- 
mendation ; but there is R minority wliosc work would, on the other 
hand, deserve n great deal of blame and censure. Tlicre is R minority 
of Ficld Officers in tlie Army, men who have not thought about this 
question, who have not studied it, m2io do not care about it, and who 
trust that some inspiiation mill come the moment they find tliemsclres 
on actiro service in the charge of outposts. Tlierc is a minority who 
have thought n great dealabout it, studiedit m great deal, Kricgs-spielcd 
it to distraction, perhaps mitten about it, even lcctured about it, think 
they know n certain amount about it, and litcrallyknnw nothing a t  all 
about it. To that minority it is quite possible I myself belong, and 
tlicreforc it will be no offence to my brethren in the minorityif I claim 
to address ~ o u  as one of them on their behalf; and I ask you that yon 
mill liarden your hearts, aud if you find that our work is badly done, 
you d l  ccnsure and blame us without reserve. I know the opei&on 
mill not be pleasant either to you or  to us ; for I k n o ~  it is rcpugnaiit 
to tho General Officers of the Arniy to have to f i n d  fault witli men who 
hnro arrircd a t  R certain position and a certain age, incfficient, but 
more from the fault of the system under which they have been brought 
up than from any shortcomings of tlieir own. It certainly will not bc 
pleasant to us to rcceivc yonr censures, and I dare say ivhcn they first 
come wvc shall not like them: our vanity will be touched, our pride 
- d l  be injured, and we shall think r e  have bccn unjustly treated. 
But wry soon x-e shall arrive a t  a better frame of mind, and we shall 
be glad indeed that tho blow has fallen upon us; we shall be glad 
because it will have awakened us from the fool’s pnraclise in mhicli we 
have been slumbering-a veritable fool’s paradise, because it has been 
one of self-deception. We shall be glad because we shall have been 
a~akcncd  to a sense of the deep, the wdl-nigh appalling, responsibilitj- 
which rests ou the shoulders of the commander of outposts on active 
service, and \re sliall be thankful that we have been aivakcned before 
it is too late, and in time to make good our professional defects at n 
less costly price than the blood, it may be the lives, of our comrades. 
If the simple method which I haye suggested for acceptance bc 
adopted, I venture to thiiik that within a wry fern months two admn- 
9 
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OX OUTPOSTS. 457 
tages will hare accrued to tlic Serrice ; first, that thc General OfEccrs 
will know which of those amongst us are incompetent and inapt to 
perform this particular portion of our d u t j  ; the other, which is by far 
the mwe pleasant aspect, namely, that ~e shall, under your guidance, 
hare  really become practical soldiers, that  TTC shall be recognized by 
our comrades as such, and as men irho liaw studied, and who know 
something of thcir profession, and who may be safely entrnstcd to 
procure for them on actire serviec those t r ro  blessings mhich are so 
invaluablc to a soldier on n campaign-security from surprise and 
nndisturbed repose. 
Lord CIILLXSFORD : Our gallant lccturcr made an appeal, s3ying that Iic was 
rathcr ignorant h o ~  outpost duty was conducted in Zululand. I 3m sure that i f  I 
had Lnoen that hc desired thc information I should harc bccn only too clclighted 
to harc told him crerjthing I kncrregarding it. The fact is, in Zuliilnnd the 
principle adopted r a s  that which the gallant lccturcr really maintained as tlic riglit 
onc; that is to E~Y, we adopted the principlc of thc line of rcsi-tancc being the 
important one. Thc line of rcsistancc \TDS a rcry short one : the troops being 
nlmys cncnmpcd in tho form of n hollor square. It -A-3s not neccssarj to send the 
outpokt’s ~entrics to  any w r y  great distance, as e r e q  man in camp r a s  ready to 
turn out at  il moment’s notice. The phn adopted b j  night was to send out sentrics 
in groups of sis, two EtaUding on Ecntry mhdst thc other four lay dorm closc 
bcliind them. They m r c  not morc, a t  the outside, than 300 yards from the camp, 
as that distnncc was considered quitc sufficient in casc of alarm to girc the necessary 
time for those who werc slecping in tents to strilic thcm b j  pulling out the poles, ond 
fall into their places for tlic dcfcncc of thc Iaagcr. The principle of haring groiips 
of six was considcrcd desirable, as i t  garc tbc donblc mntrics the close support of 
four other men, and thus incrcascd the hnicrliatc strcngth of the sentrj  h e .  I n  
the dxy time, generally spcnliing, there werc no infantry Ecntrics out at all, but the 
mounted troops werc pushed forrt-ard somc tno  or threc miles, and postcd as 
wdcttcs. Tliey also fulfilled another duty, wliicli nns that of guarding thc cattle, 
bccausc, of coime, with thc large number of cattle we had d l i  1~4,  it 1x13 necessary 
to send thcm out t o  gram a t  ecmc distancc from camp, and it was neccssarj to 
g i i a ~ l  against il stampcde. The sjstcm nas PO simplc that i t  is scarcely ncccssary, 
1 trast, to explain the sp tem any further. The camp itself =as the linc of rcsist- 
nnce, nhcrc c re r j  man xras rcacly to turn out und fall into his fighting place nt a 
moment’s notice, and thc scntrics were merely required to offer such resistance a3 
rrould girc time for thc inen to get into their places, when they would fall back at 
once. I nn ip rc  xt-c arc rcr1 much indebted to Colonel Halt for the most interesting 
lccturc he has gircn, and I think, to a great extent, all thc principles which he has 
adranced arc sound, but hc has perliaps laid n littlc too much Etrcss upon the 
rcsisting linc being the principal onc j becauso i t  oppcars to me it is EO wry  
dificult to obtain it. You will see, ss a rule, that troops must be placed where 
tiicy can get wood and watcr, and that, gencrallj speaking, is in thc  lo^ ground, 
wherms the rcsisting line rould nlmost ncecssarily be nnhigli ground. Of course 5 
forcc might be encampcd on il gcntlc undulating plain, where both might be found 
combincd, but it coiikl not a1n.n~~ be tho case. The rcsisting line must, therefore, 
eometinics bc tlic onc rrhicli tho outpost sen-trics or pickets occupy. KO hard and 
fast riilc can bc laid d o m ,  and it would, in my opinion, bc a mistake to lay doen 
that a line of obseiration is newr to bc made tlic linc of resistance. With regard 
to the posting of sentries, thcpiccoliposti of thc Italian Scmcc I bclierc to be the 
right and the sound principlc, morc capccially becauscit relieres the men ~ 1 1 0  arc on 
picket (which is a r e r j  fatiguing duty) of n great deal of unnecessary work. For 
instance, all those n-110 harc to  adopt thc English system of outpost duty must 
linon- perfectly well horn long it takes to rclicrc your sentries, and what 3 distance 
the relief has to  march ; x~hcrca3 if 5011 put the rclicf close behiud thc sentry, all 
that unnecessary labour i3 sared. So long as these piccoliposli-these small groups 
-arc properly placed and posted, it appeara to me IOU m i r e  at thc most perfect 
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45s OX OUTPOSTS, 
principle of an obserring linc tliat you can possibly Lare Kith the least possible \Tear 
and tear of your mcn's pli+quc. 
Sir EDT~U.D IIAXLEY: Colonel Za lc  1123 giren R ririd picture, which 1 am sure 
must hare struck crerybody, of the clifficultic3 and complications attcnding the con- 
structiou of any good system of ontposts, and Ican assure anybody d o  trie3 it that 
it n-ill tcst all liis knorrledgc and ingenuity to dcrisc onc. Tlicrc arc two or thrce 
points neccsary to be considcred on nbicll the lc-ttrrcr only Iiglitly touclied, and 
wliieli I may mention. I n  the first plncc, in derising a systcm, it appears to me to 
be most iniportaiit to come to some good untlcrstanding as to the proportion th:it 
should csist bctwcn the forcc of the outposts and tlic main body. It ~ o u l i l  not do 
to fir tIii3 arbitinrilx; it  would not do tosay it &a11 be one-tcntli or one-ci,oIitIi, or 
any other proportion ; it  must rary according to tlic circumstanccs of tlic ground, 
and that makcs tlic problcni nll the Iinrdcr. The force must bc saeli as to afford 
securitr, but i t  must not be so grcat as to harass tlie army in ordcr to  maintain and 
relierc i t ;  and to reconcile tlicsc conditions is, of itself, a rcry diliicult niatter. 
Scxt comes tlie distribution or dirkion of tlic rarions bodic3 forming tlic outposts, 
on rhieli Coloncl IInlc liar gonc mncli into detail, and lias shorn us a great rariety 
of sjstems. They look rery simple on paper, but tlie difficulty i3 in applying tlicin 
to the ground, and, as lie says, prnctice is iiiost necessary to cnsurc any kind of 
proficicncr in thi3 respect. Then thcrc is a third matter on d i i ch  1 do not think 
lie touched a t  all, and that. is 011 tlic command and coniloct of tlicsc bodies. I need 
not tcll many of you, \rho know it  better than I do, Iiow difficult i t  i3 to command, 
nnd.eausc to act in unity, bodies so widely separated as thcse, and froin vhom so 
difficult a duty i3 dcmanrlcd, ncmely, tlint of rctreoting in good ordcr, without an>- 
confusion, and taking adruntage of tlic accidents of the ground to oppose an cncnir, 
whom wc must supposc to bc alrrays supcrior in forcc froin tlic circunistnnces of the 
caw. 'Cliesc, then, arc tlic points irllicli anrbody trlio tries to &rise R sFsteni of 
outposts will liarc rrrain1:- to considcr. I will not attempt. critically to esaniinc thc 
Eevernl Erstenis nliicli Colonel IIale ha3 presented to our notice, bccausc the?- 
demand k r j -  careful consideration, and i t  ~~-ould bc presuinptoous to do so on short 
notice. I will only say the featarc lic mentiom as bcing n spccial clinracteristic of 
the German sgstcm nppcar~ to me to gire it at once a prc-emincncc-that of 
simplicity--\rliicli is most esscntial. On tlie otlier hand, tlic Dutch sjstem nppearcd 
to me to offer tlic most doubtful and dnngeroiis conditions, for I think 110 said it 
rlemandcd that the outpost line slioiiltl bc tlic figliting Iiic, and that the army 
should come 1111 to reinforce tliat line. It is obvious? supposing any part of that 
line i3 carried by a sudden rush of tlic cneniy bcforc I t  could bc so occupied, tlw 
sliole arrangcnienl nould go to picccs. Portlier, as n matter of minor detail, it 
appcarj to me that sentrica not only sliould not engage, but that tlicp may 
probably bc forbidden to fire, and sliould only signal the approach of tlie cncmy. I 
think \re must all fccl 110w fiilly justificd Colonel IIalc is in saying thnt vhcn other 
armics arc cngaged in such studica and clrercise~ as these, it  would be most unpr-  
donablc if ire neglcctcd tlieiii ; and wc arc greatly indcbtcd to anFonc who likc him 
will come forward and instruct u.* in the subject. I ~ l i ~ ~ l d  not rcnturc to say any- 
thing about i t  only that I formcrlr gare sonic attcntion to tlie subject and arrired a t  
conclusions nliicli I put forth in n small book ; and I n9t only had tlic opportmnity 
of coming to tliesc concIusions tlieoretiailly, but of testinn them in sonic dcgrcc 
practically, for tlie Oniccr commanding zit Ailclersliot at  tliat ;me ~ 1 i c d  to carry out 
somc of ~ n y  vicrrs, ond fornisl~cd troops for tlrc purposc ; and n great many Officers, 
among tlicm sonic Iiigli in authorit-, eamc to look on. I could not, of course, 
choose what ground I plea~cd ; I rrad obliged to take what offered, shicli scs not at  
all that I should h a w  chosen. Uowcrcr, I eiidcaroured to make thc best of it, 
and I may say that tlic result satisfied mc that, liad wc bcen really engaged with nil 
enemy, tlic outposts ~ o u l d  havc doiic their di1t.y effectually in retarding that eneiny 
sufficiently to enable the army to place itself on its guard. I d l  only furthcr add 
that the encoungenient I rccciretl 011 that occasion was not such as to induce me to 
nrtend iny enquiries into the subject of outposts, eitlier practically or tlieoretically. 
I beg lo  offer my own best thanks to Colonel lIalc for a lecturc shicli does grcat credit 
to him and to the Institution of sliicli lie i3 nn eminent member. I liarc n l ~ ~ a y s  
t l l o~gh t  that it ij rcry propcr that from tlic Institution the original inritation to 
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US OUTPOSl‘S. 459 
di5cusa subjects like these should proceed-subjects which nrc of thc highest interest 
to tlic Army n t  large-and I am cscccdingly glad that such lins been thc case in thc 
prcscnt instance. 
3Ir. C. B. JIAYSE, R.E. : Coloncl IIalc referred to outpost duty in Afghanisfan, 
and said he should be glad to liarc somc morc information on that subjcct. The 
outpost duty in that countrf was very siniplc so far as i t  went. All our opcrntions 
took placc in the ralleys. At  Jcllalabad the rallcy was over 20 miles wide, and 
formed a large lerel plain, EO that thcrc w33 no particular line of approach a t  all, 
and pickcts irerc throm-n out all round tlic camps. But thcsc pickets wcrc not 
thrown out rcry far. It n-as a knoirn charactcristic of the pcople that they would 
ncrcr attack in opcn day, and in fact there was only one instancc in thc whole of 
that two years’ war in sliichthcy did makc any attack on a camp, and that was on a 
moon-light night, n t  ForL Batt.jc, which had only soinc slight brcastrrorks. On that 
occasion they camc tip a rarine, on thc cdgc of tvhich the camp aas, and on which 
thc camp liar1 oftcn been mrncd that a pickct should be placed to watch it, hut, 
however, nobody crer placed 3 picket therc ; and it rias lip this rcry rarinc that a 
Isric body of men camc on this occasion, nnd attacked our post, killing onc Officer 
and nineteen men bcforc tlic troops could turn out, nnd eren then, most of the 
Afghans remained outside the brcastworks throwing in stones, and it was only a fcm 
plucky inen ivlio daslicd in who did the damage. It  as not tlic habit of tlic 
Afghans to attack at  all, and in consequence tlic outposts were rery small indeed : 
tbqr rately aniounted to ow- one-eighth of thc force. In the rallcjs round Cabul, 
you could not mom across tlic country tiwing to tlic irrigation channcl. Tlic 
camps wcrc generally pitched on whatcrer opcn s p ~ c c  ould bc got, and tlic pickcts 
were placed within two or thrcc hundred jards of thc camp on thc rising knoh round. 
If  TC lialtcd a day or so cva&-yiraa scnt out firc or sin niile~ along tlic rsllcjs : tlic 
hills on cithcr side ncro impassahlo for anyone to go ox r .  \vc used to see rintch- 
fire3 on the hi& hcrc and there, but no largc bodics of Afghans ever came orcr 
tliem. On tlic line of march, cavalry w n t  about threc or four miles bcjond the 
camping placc and rcturncd, but ils rcgards actual night and day outposts, thcy 
ircrc allrrap within afcw hundred yards of thc camp. Patrolling \ v a ~  not \-cry great, 
and patrols werc somefimcs fired on. I n  onc casc, at  Gundamnk, d e n  horses 
wcrc bcing stolen, the 10th Ilusrars scnt out soino patrols to try and prcvcnt this 
thiering. One was fired on and thc non-commissioned officer was shot in thc arm ; 
and tho liability to such accidents rathcr discourngcd ptrolling at that timc ; but 
thcrc was a l w a p  patrolling when nn enemy n-as thought to bc near at  hand. You 
could obtain the information IOU wanted to any cstcnt by spics, and nhencrer therc 
was a chsncc of nn attack of any kind, tlic information wm known days bcforcliand, 
and crcn then these fellom Iiad to be attacked; so that  tlie outpost duties ircrcrcry 
simple.‘ 
1 TIE. camps w r c  squarc-shaped, and wlicncrer an outljing pickct post ivas 
rcquirecl, tlic ncarcst battaIion supplied it. Each battalion toId off an inljing pickct 
wliich remained in camp and slcpt fully accoutrcd. The field Officer of tlic day had 
corninand of thcsc outljing pickcts and had to Tisit thcm by night and b r  day, and 
tlic field Officcr ncst for duty h3d command of the inlying pickets. Most of the 
outlying pickets m r c  vitlidraIvn by day, only a fcw posts of observation bcing kcpt 
up, anci the caralry csnlnincd thc mllcjs for a distnncc. Thcsc outposts wcrc rcally 
morc for police measures than for nctual protection, as thc outljing pickets were 
circly morc than 200 or 300 p r d s  from camp, and gcncnlly corercd thcinselvea 
with small stone breastworks, behind whicli they slept, throwing out tn-o or threc 
single scntrics to their front. Tlicsc would prcrent nny hrgc bodics of thieves 
getting into camp, d i i l c  tlic qwrtcr-guard scntrics posted round thc edgc of tlic 
camp wcrc supposed to stop solitary thiercs. Sometimes, if much thicring wcnt on, 
“ shikar,” or shooting psrtics of tn-o or threc good shots, Tcrc scnt out aftcr night- 
fa11 to liidc and shoot anyonc thcy saw without cliallcnging: thi3 was very 
effectire. Special patrols a t  dajbrcak were oftcn scnt out when circumstance3 
inade tlicir use judicious, but the troops rarely, if crcr, fell in undcr arms bcforc 
dajbrcak in casc of nttack. The only orders were tlmt in case of an attack tho 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [J
oh
ns
 H
op
kin
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
3:4
4 1
0 J
an
ua
ry
 20
15
 
460 OX OUTPOSTS. 
Colonel Sir LUMLIX Grnrrau, Bart. : I am not going to rcnturc to ta lc  up jour  
timc n i th  any criticism of my own on what our lecturer has so ably stated; but hc 
i r as  kind enough to send mc thc heading3 of his lecture, and I remarked amongst 
them the question of the ad&Jbilitr or not of clianging the position of outposts a t  
night. I rcmembercd reading, a long timc ago, a little book mitten by the n-ell- 
l inom Narshal Bu~caud, called " Instructions pratiquc3 pour Ics 'l'ronpcs en 
" Campape," and I rcmcmbercd thcrc was somcthing in i t  about tha t  rev qucstioii 
of the position of pickets a t  night. I rcfcrrcd to i t  and found this. He F ~ T S ,  "By 
'I day time it would be sufiicient to  occupy m t h  rcry weak posts the commanding 
I' point; from xhcncc you can ECC afar off. It is by day that the CJC guards you; by 
" night, as you cannot ECC far, it  i3 ncccssary that your posts d o u l d  bc much farther 
'I forward. This principle is dkmetricnlly opposed to thc receircd usa,nes and 
" n-rittcn rules of ccrtain books j but  ncrcrthcless it B according t o  good conimon 
'' sense." Thc practicc he &cusses rcfcrs morc par t ichr ly  to warfare in Africa, 
and therefore he gircs ccrtain details which were merely suitcd to tlic Frcncli war- 
fare in that countrx, and are not northmcntioning here. At  the samcthnc, he says 
thc general practice he adrocates of pushing outposts morc to thc front by night 
than they arc by day is applicable also to Europcan warfare, and mentions liorv hc 
himself practiscd it with succcss in Spain. IIc gocs on to discuss an objection to 
tl& principlc, which is raked by somc pcoplc, that you exposc your outposts t o  be 
captured by pushing thcm on so far. IIc 
thinks tbat of COUEC thc pcoplc who place tlie outposts know the ground betmen 
thcm and thcir main body wry  much bcttcr than the pcoplc v-bo arc goinn to attack 
thcm, and, tbcrcfore, that with coinnion care tlicj- will harc no difficulty% retiring 
on the main body, particnlnrly as thc outposts arc placcd after dusk, and thc 
cncmy would not linorr exactly nlirrc thcy were, and if tlicy did stumblc upon thcm, 
thcy would bc much morc afraid of thcm than the outposts would bc of thc cneniy : 
therefore, he thinks tlicrc is rery liltlc risk of the outposts being cut off. At any 
rate, he thinks it is rcry important that outposts should be pushed far to thc front 
at night, EO as to girc sccurity to the troops, and hc certainly dwells ratlier on 
thc The OlTiccr who last sp0h-c mcntioncd 
a case in which, from want of precaution, therc xi-as a Eurprisc in Afghanistan, and 
Nmh.1 Ilugcaud rcfcrs to thc ccrf sort of cam himsclf. IIc says JOU must ncrcr 
suppose nhen in thc ficld that an encmy, because hc is not in thc habit of innking 
an attack in this or that -.ray, will ncrcr do it ; but you must bc prcparcd for any 
attack hc may possibly make, and according to  that, although the natircs were not 
in thc habit of attacking a t  night, hc certainly would not harc left any approach to  
hi3 position unwatched. There was a point that Sir Edrrard Hamley had mentioned 
Hc docs not think that is the case at  all. 
rcsistancc " than thc "obacrration." 
men wcre to fall in as soon as possiblc in front of thcir respectirc lincs, and wait for 
ordcre, thc out1jin.g and iiilying pickets being supposed to be ablc to afford sufficicnt 
rcsistancc until this could bc clonc, but no definite or exact line of defcncc was told 
off in thc temporary wmps, though in thc pcrmancnt camp3 or posts along the linc 
of cnmmunication, the mcn were oftcn practiscd in tnkcn up tlicir alarm posts. In 
E O ~ C  of thc pcrmancnt camps, pickets wcrc postcd a milc or inore from tlie camp, 
for obscrration only, and thcn thcy nere proridcd with blockhotiscs. Xost of thc 
pcrmanent camps, cspccially the small ones, xcrc surrounded by high mud walls, 
which could not be rushed (Fort Battyc was aftcrwards proridcd Kith thcm also), 
and in sucli cases, outpost duty of coursc nas reduccd to a minimum, as only a fciv 
scntrics were required along thc walls! Thc following is an extract from Brigadicr- 
Gcncnl Sir Thomas Baker's, K.C.B., orders rclatirc to the troops cn  the line of 
march : ' I  On arriral in camp, the ficld Officcr of the day is to report to the Brigaclc- 
" Najor, to post the outlying pickets, and to  makc the neccssary arrmgcmcnh for 
'I thc sccurity of the camp. 'I'hc field Officer nest for duty is to command the in- 
'< 13.ing pickets (cnc company pcr regiment) thc O5ccrs and men of which an: to elccp 
'' nitli their accoutrcments on. A11 prcls  and inlying pickets arc to paride -sit11 
" regiments whcn thc The outlying pickcts ml l  rcccire orders 
I' according to circumstances as to thc timc of quitting their posts, and whether the? 
" arc to  form the adranee or rcar-guards of tlic column, or arc to join their rcspcc- 
'I tire rc,@ncnts."-C. B. N. 
fall in ' sounds. 
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OX OUFPOSTS. 461 
that n-as not touclicd u ion by tlic Iccturcr,-the command of outposts ; a i r 1  that 
reminds mc of my littic cxpcricncc in the field in tlie Crimea. Whcn n c  first 
lnarchcd up from thc Alma to Scbmtopol, TC did placc E O ~ C  outposts, and I was 
aidc-dc-camp to a Brigadier d o  had rcry adranccd nolions upon thc question, nnd 
Ilk i&a was to  placc outposts rcry far to thc front. I n  thc samc dirision, hoxrercr, 
tlicrc nas anctlicr Brigadicr who took ri totally diffcrent ricw of ontpostsnnd placcd 
tlicni mithin 100 jards or EO of thc camp mcrcly as a sort of qiiartcr-pard. About 
two days aftcr wc appcarcd before Scbnstcpol, wc morcd off to the lcft and took up 
o position for thc night, not far fromIiamicsh. Wc m r c  ordcrcd to placc outposts, 
and tllc two brigades accordingly did so, each under tlic control of its o m  Brigadicr. 
Wc found that our outposts werc orcr-lapping thcsc of tlic other brigadc and a long 
imy in front of them-somcthinglikc half a-milc ; iTliicli ccrtaidy nas a great wasto of 
poirer, and might harc led to scrious mischicf, and all that 11ad to bc changcd. 
That Icd me, a t  thc timc, to think it nas n r y  ncccssary that onc Officer should harc 
charge of placing tlic outposts on cncli front of the camp so as to aroicl any diliicnlty 
of thc sort. 
General FEET, C.B. : Coloncl IIalc has alluded to tlic scction in thc '*Field 
" Excrciscs rclatirc to outposts not being complctc j may I, thercforc, bc pcrinittcd 
to explain that at  thc timc tlic first manacurrcs took placc thcrc were no instructions 
for outposts iTith thc cxccption of a fcri paragmphs, which dctailcd that thcrc wns 
to be an inlying picket and an outljing pickct? d small Committcc was, fhcrcforc, 
ordcrcd to asscmblc and to  p rcp~rc  n book on outposts, to be r c d y  for tlie 
m~nocunc3. This was done in r:thcr a hurry ; as may bc imsgincd, it was inconi- 
plctc, and littlc has bccn donc sincc. Generally, thcrcforc, I pcrfcctly agrcc with 
Culoncl LIalc that niany alterations arc rcquired. Thc czact sjstcm to bc adopted 
for outposts cannot be laid down as a hard and fast rulc; tlic principles may. 
I agrcc with ercry Ford of that lcttcr from tlic.clistin,rmishcd German Ofiiccr irhicli 
 as rcad by Coloncl Hale. It conrcjs my cicn-s far bcttcr than I could conrev 
tlicni myself. In  our Arm-j, mcrc than in any othcr, it is rcquired that Ofiiccrs 
should stndy tho principlcs, study cxactly what is vnntcd, study the ground, thc 
mcthods of acquiring information, and thc primiplc of mlicn dcfcncc can tatc 
placc, and wkcn it is ncccasnry to fall back, mcrcly retarding the enemy j but it is 
impossib1c:to 1x1 do\m d c h i t c  rules for thc dishnccs bctwccn scntrics, supports, or 
rcscrrcs. Whcn at  Aldershot I harc often heard Officcrs ordered to mow their 
pickets back, though i ~ c l l  placcd, bccausc they ncrc nenrcr to tlic scntrics than tlic 
clistancc laid d c m  in the instrtwtions, thc regulation distancc had bccn mc.asurcd, 
and tlic pickets or supports movcd to thc spot measurcd. I agrce cntircly with 
Colonel lIalc in the principle that rcgimcntal Officcr~ and company Ofliccrs should 
hc lcft to tlicnisclrcs in thc disposal of outposts, and tha t  it is by instruction, not 
only of thcm, but of the non-commissioncd ofiiccrs and the mcn, that tlie necessary 
restilt is to bc obt.aincd. T h y  must bc iustruc!cd as to thc mcaning of outposts 
and the object6 to bc obtaincd. Xnny o time, going round thc outposts, I harc 
rccn tlic scntricj facing tlic wrong nay nnd looking out towar+ thcir war, no o m  
interfering with tlicm in  thc slightest dcgrcc. The Officers, haring postcd them n t  
certain distanccs apart, considered that nas sufficient. I am afraid what Co:oncl 
Halo said about gciicral Officers acnding gcncral ideas to Colonels of rcgmcnts and 
ficld Officers, pnd rcqucsting them to draw out a plan of tlic manncr thc outposts 
should be plnccd under thc circumstanccs containcd in thc gcncral id-, to bc 
criticizccl bv tlic Gcncral, would not succeed in our Amy, bcauzc, iisually, if n 
gcneral Ofiiccr finds fault, or ezprcsscs his riens, hc is inuncdistclj callcd an old 
fool, an antiquated person irho docs not undcratand anjthing of the Tank  of the 
prcscnt day. When wc haw the hCT sjstcm in forcc, and fewer Geneids, I trust there 
i d 1  bc an improrcnicnt in this rcspcct. I saw, xrlicn in Italy, that tlic principles of 
thc  Italian outposts wcrc ndniirablc in theory j but. for thc racticc I cannot sa-j much. 
Tlic small posts werc, gcncrally speaking, rcry well condktcd; but, as they mrcly 
go off a road, they cannot bc of mu& iisc. Thc sp tcms for outposts required in 
various countries arc rcry tliffcrcnt. A m.tn who in dshantccland foltoircd tlic 
principlc3 laid donn in thc Austrian, thc Russian, or thc Frcnch Aniiics lrould hare 
failed; and a inan nlio folloncd tlic samc principles in Zululand would ham becn 
irrong. From That I harc hcmd of the Afghan Wur, thcy only lint1 pickets and 
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462 OX OUTPOSTS. 
inlying pickets, and thc plan ansmered ; thc fact being that crerjthing must 
depcnd upon thc circumstances in nliieli you arc phccd, and upon the country in 
which you arc working. I n  Germany therc are large open plains, nnd tlie same in 
Austria, whcrc sou can follow out any principlc laid dorm; but in a thickly 
~roodecl or cncloscd country, or a country like Zululand or h'stal, no regular 
prineiple can bc laid down; r e  must study the rrarits of thc country. If you 
remember, in thc Crimea thero Kerc two battles fought *on totally diffcrent 
principlcj, ciz., thc sortie on the 26th October, in which, by tlic orders of S i r  dc 
Lacy Erans, tlic pickets fell back and defended thc linc of thc Second Dirkion, and 
thc Dattlc of Inkcrman, when thc division under Sir John Pcnncfather rcinforccd 
tlic linc of pickets and commenced the battle on that line. Coloncl IIalc lias Ilinted 
that we 1laTC had no erperiencc of night duty. Having spcnt fourteen months in 
thc trenches, I had a little cxpcricncc of night work, and I ain perfectly sure i t  is 
pos5iblc to placc outposts a t  night so that tlicy nould prcrcnt auyonc passing; but 
to do that, you must mix up thc patrolling with thc sentry system ; and by il corn- 
bination of thesc, and with Officcr~ constantly risiting their sentries, you can prc- 
Tent. a singlc man going through thc outposts. At onc timc in tllc Crimca our 
trcnehes m r c  constantly pcnctratcd by an Albanian, n-ho Iieadcd il party vho a m c  
out to nscertain nhctlier our sentrim ncre Tell postcd nnrl alcrt. Our Officers 
knew ns well a3 possible xvhcn thcsc sorties riould bc succcssful ; thcy judged by tlic 
OZccr \rho 1vas in command of tlic party furnisliiug tlic outposts. I I i a ~ c  heard 
joung fellom in my o m  regiment rcmark, whcn thc ficld Officcr r a s  dctailed to 
conimand thc adrancccl posts, '' 0 1 1  ! ivc sliall hare a sortie of tlic Russians to-nig3t ; 
" that old blokc i3 in command; " alluding to EOIIIC ficld Officcr in mhom the j  had 
no confidcnce. At  another tiinc thcy riould say " Coloncl So-and-so in command, 
" lic will keep us all right ; " meaning thc outposts would be EO placed they n-ould 
girc an alarm bcforc anyonc could gct into tlic trcuclics. Therefore, ag Coloncl 
lIalc sap ,  t.hc field Officer \rho command3 tlic outposts is the principal person on 
wlioni dcrolrcs tlic grcatcst part of tlic responsibility, although tlic other Officcrs 
and sltbordinatcs rcquire to liarc been propcrl~ instructed how to carry out thc 
order3 of thcir superior. 
The CIIAIINAS : I do not know anytliing that lias given mc more pleasurc for I? 
long timc thau hearing this lccturc. Tlic namc was not mcntioncd, but I requirc 
wry littlc further hint aftcr hearing tliat letter to  know n i j  dear old friend wlio 
trrotc it. IIc is an admirablc man, a man of tlic same Icngth of Ecrricc as mjself, 
but ~vlio, iikc all of us nho really lore our profession, i3 stutljing i t  ns iutensely 
to-day ns a t  the first, and is trjing to makc thc Soung gentlcnwn of tlic Army study 
i t  also. IIe 1x1s a man with \rliom I liad 3 grcat dcal of intcrcoursc in former days, 
nucl I know that up t o  the prcscnt timc, ivhcn hc is in command of a rcrr  Iargc 
body of troops a t  a 'cry important station, Iic is stucljing tlic principle3 of his 
profession as niucli as he did when Iic was a Foung man. All I hare  to ntld to 
what lias bccn so admirably 1 :d  beforc us by Coloncl Hnlc, is this : that probablj- 
from tlic prcdilcction of Irtring scrrcd through two campaigns iritli them, nnd 
liaring studied their sjstcni carefully from the very bottom, I do inelinc more to tlic 
Gerlnaii system of outposts than to any other, and for thc reason3 which Colonel 
U d c  so xrell brought bcforc us. Their principlc of outposts is formulated on 
simplicity, on common scnsc, and on tliorougli instruction to all rsnks of Officers 
who harc to carry it out. I n  3. littlc work to wliieh I oucc trastcd myself on 
" Carnlry Orpniziltion," I made tlic rcuiark that." I must honestly confess drill i3 
" onc of my passions ;I' I 1x1s wry  fond of it, and gnw m y  d o l c  hcart and soul to 
i t  ; but I could not conccire irli' men bccamc so drc:idfully nerrous d e n  thcy got 
comniand of a regiment or brigade, and cndearoured to iinprcss on othcrs that the>- 
~liould consider thnt the same prineiplcs which guidcd tlic command of a corponl's 
party xrcrc really thosc which, with Iargcr csperience aiid dccpcr tliought, controllccl 
tlic comuiand of n regiment or of a brignde. I kavc 
Iiad n great dcal of conrersation on outpost duty \t-itli many people ; thcy scem to 
look upon i t  ns a sort of bugbear, a sort of thing that no fellow a n  understaud. 
It is tlic $implcst thing in tlic world, if you will bcliew it is merely carr1ing out 
tlic ordinary precautions that you take in marching out to il. Geld day, nitli, of 
coursc, the circumstance3 which add to it. Tlicrc is one adnirablc part of tlie 
If is tlic same with outposts. 
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0s OUTPOSTS. 4G3 
German system -ahieli I redly thought morc of than  an^ other, nnd tliat is, that  
such an abominable systcm as prerailcd in former days, of what. was called “mired 
‘‘ outposts,” is ntterly unknom in the German Service. Whatercr the body i3 
which has to girc outposts, it is a unit. The outposts arc gircn by n dirision, n 
brigade, a battalion, a regiment, a company ; but they nrc giren by a unit wholly 
and solely, and the Officer in command of that unit is tho Commanding Ofilcer of 
the outposts, not an unfortunate Gcncnl or Field Officer nlio i3 taken away from 
his own command and put  to command men idiom he ncrer s3w before, but n man 
nlio thoroughly bnoivs and is trusted by those whom lie is commanding. Colonel 
IIale said he d r e r t k l  morc to-day to outposts placcd casual l~ on ground that had 
suddenly to be occupied. TIic most reniarlrablc instance of outposts on knorrn 
ground I crcr saw in13 that rrliicli was in roguc bcforc Paris, and the onc corps 
ivliosc system of outposts I most carefully studicd was the 5th Corps. It was 
simply this : half the corps wa3, a3 you may say, on forepost duty ; thcr were 
before the Iieadquartclu of tlic ttro dirisions rcspcctircly. Each dirision bcpt a 
brigade in quarters, one n t  Tcrsailles, tlic otlicr at  Bcaurcgnrcl, and that b r ipdc  
h c l  perfect rest ; the other brigade  as on outpost duty. Of that brigadc, each 
rcgimcnt of thrcc battalions occupied one section of tlie front. Or’ each regiment 
onc battalion was alwap on outpost duty; two battalions formed the rcjerrc. That 
gare perfect rest to a rcrf large portion of tlic forcc,first to 1 d f  of the arnir 
corps, next to that part of the otlier half wIiicIi was not actuilly on outpost duty”; 
SO that the proportion usnl on this harassing duty was about one-sixth of the 
wliolc. I am quitc sure, as Colonel IIalc 113s no obscrrations to ofcr in reply to 
m y  of tlic rcmarbs made to-day, you mll cmporrcr mc to tentlcr him a most 
sincere Tote of thanks for the extremely intcrc3ting Iecturc he has given us. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [J
oh
ns
 H
op
kin
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
3:4
4 1
0 J
an
ua
ry
 20
15
 
